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LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.
and profit of the party entitled to
the services under the agreement.
The only adequate remedy is to
prevent the wrong, and that can
be no otherwise administered than
by an injunction. The defendant
is shown to be a person of superior
abilities and acquirements in his
pursuit of a tenor singer, and his
.addition to an operatic troupe as
one of its members would not fail
to be an attraction to the public,
and a source of profit to the man-
ager in whose employment he
should render his services. The
case accordingly does present the
right to an injunction under the
rules which have been made ap-
plicable to the issuing of that
order."
In conclusion, the cases upon
this subject show that the English
courts at first refused to grdnt such
injunctions under any -circum-
stances. Gradually they came to
grant relief in cases where an
express negative covenant formed
part of the agreement. Finally,
the modern doctrine has become
established in England, that where
a contract for personal services is
of such a nature that adequate
compensation could not be secured
by seeking damages in an action at
law, its breach may be enjoined by
a court of equity, even in the
absence of an express negative
covenant.
The courts of this country have
reached, substantially, the same
conclusion after passing through-
similar preliminary stages, and
although there are still to be found,
even among modern adjudications,
decisions which deny this equitable
remedy, the prevailing current of
authority-sanctions the jurisdiction
of equity iA such cases.
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Telegrapih Compianies-Limiation of Liability.
The stipulation in the message blank of a telegraph company which
provides that the company shall not be liable for any mistakes or delays
in the transmission of an unrepeated message, beyond the amount
received for sending the same, does not apply to the sendee.
1 46 Pa., 375. Decided January 4, I892.
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THE LIMITATION OF THE LIABILITY OF A TEIEGRAPH COMPANY.
The subject will be discussed
under two heads: (I) How may a
telegraph company limit its liabil-
ity? (2) To what extent may the
liability be limited?
In discussing the first •question
the writer assumes that the liability
may be limited, and .vhere the
phrase, "the company is entitled
to the benefit of these conditions"
occurs, of course only that benefit
which the law allows is meant.
In discussing the second ques-
tion, the writer assumes that which
leading writers declare to be the
law in this respect, viz., that tele-
graph companies are not insurers,
and are liable for want of due care
only.
(I) How May a Telegraph Corn-
fiany Limit its Liability ?-It is
well s~ttled that a telegraph com-
pany may limit its liability by an
express contract: Passmore v. Tel.
Co., 78 Pa.,238. So when a message
is delivered t6 the company, written
on one of the regularly prepared
message blanks, which contains cer-.
tain stipulations and conditions,
the company is entitled to the ben-
efit of those conditions in an action
brought, by the sender: Passmore
v. Tel. Co.,. 78 Pa., 238; Wann v.
Tel. Co., 37 Mo., 472; Lassiter v.
Tel. Co., 89 N. C., 334; Tel. Co. v.
Henderson, 89 Ala., 510; AVolf v.
Tel. Co., 62 Pa., 83; Tel. Co., v.
Dunfield, II Colo., 335; Aiken v.
Tel. Co, 5 S. C., 358. This rule is
followed even though the sender is
not aware of the conditions con-
tained in the message blank: Hill
v. Tel. Co., 85 Ga., 425.
The question has arisen whether
a telegraph company may limit its
liability by a mere notice, and it
has been held that a copy of cer-
tain rules and regulations posted
in a conspicuous place in the com-
pany's office is 5ufficient to entitle
the company to their benefit; and
in the same case there is a dictum
to the effect that a man will be
bound by the regulations of a tele-
graph company whether he knows
of them or not: Birney v. Tel. Co.,
18 Md., 341, followed in Tel. Co. v.
Gildersleeve, 29 Md., 232.
On the other hand it has been
held that the stipulations in the
message blank are of no avail when
the message is delivered to the
company, written on a plain sheet
of paper and not on the blank con-
taining the stipulations. Pearsall
v. Tel. Co., 44 Hun., 532. In this
case, however, it was intimated in
the opinion that the plaintiff might
have been non-suited had there
not been evidence that he- had no
knowledge of the regulations or
stipulations. It will thus be seen
that this case lays down a rule con-
trary to the dictum in Birney v.
Tel. Co., though it is, perhaps, in
accord with the actual decision of
that case.
From these cases it appears that
a telegraph company may limit its
liability by notice, if the notice is
brought to the knowledge of the
sender. See also Tel. Co. v. Bu-
chanan, 35 Ind., 429.
If, however, a telegraph company
may limit its liability by a notice
brought to the knowledge of the
sender, why should it not be able
to limit its liability also by a notice
brought to the knowledge of the
sendee.? It may be said to be well
settled in those States where the
question has arisen that, so far as
thesendeeis concerned, the liability
of a telegraph company may not be
limited by a notice even though
brought to the sendee's knowledge:
Tel. Co. v. Richman, r9 XV. N. C.,
569; Tobin v. Tel. Co., 146 Pa., 375.
LIABILITY OF A TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
The reason for this distinction is
not pointed out in the decided cases,
the point being passed over with
the mere mention of the fact that
the stipulations in the message
blanks do not apply to the sendee.
A reason for this distinction which
suggests itself to the mind of the
writer is the analogy which exists
between telegraph companies and
common carriers. A common car-
rier may not limit its liability by a
mere notice, but only by an express
contract. Redman's Law of Rail-
way Companies as Carriers. Ed.
1970, p. 32. Therefore, stipulations
contained in bills of lading or
freight recipts do not apply to the
consignee or sendee because there
is no contract between him and the
carrier. When the rule in regard
to limiting liability was applied to
telegraph companies, though it was
extended so as to be effective where
knowledge of the regulations. is
brought home to the sender, the
idea of a contract still remained.
The one employing the company
was considered to contract with it
subject to any reasonable regula-
tions of which he had knowledge,
and therefore as the sendee made
no contract with the company, the
regulations were said not to apply to
him even though he knew of them.
It would seem, therefore, that
where a contract is made between
the telegraph company and the
receiver of a message, the stipula-
tions ought to apply to the receiver
if he had knowledge of them, and
in accordance with this view, in
Tel. Co. v. Stevenson, 128 Pa., 442,
where 'the action was brought by
the receiver of a message, who had
entered into a contract with the
telegraph company to furnish him
with stock quotations, it was held
that it was a question for the jury
whether, owing to certain peculiar
circumstances, the company had
waived thebenefit'of its regulations,
and not that the regulations did
not apply to the sendee.
The following, therefore, are our
conclusions as to how a telegraph
may limit its liability: (i) The lia-
bility may be limited by an express
contract; (2) the liability to persons
who employ the company may be
limited by a notice brought to the
knowledge of the employer.
(i) To what Extent Iay a Tele-
graphb Company Limit its Lia-
bility? In considering this phase
of the question of the limitation of
the liability ofa telegraph company,
it is most important to keep ell
in mind the fact that telegraph
companies are not insurers, and are.
liable only for want of due care:
Gray's Cbmmunications by Tele-
graph, p. i9; Thompson's Law of
Electricity, 1.39.
The view adopted generally by
the American courts, is that a tele-
graph company may not limit the
liability which it incurs by reason
of its "gross negligence," but may
stipulate against liability for "or-
dinary negligence." See opinion
of Mr. Justice DAviS in Pegram /.
Tel. Co., 97 N. C., 57; also Redpath
v. Tel. Co.,.112 Mass., 71 ; Carew v'.
Tel. Co., 15 Mich., 525; Wann v.
Tel. Co., 37 Mo., 472; Becker v.
Tel. Co., ii Neb., 87; Breese v.
Tel. Co., 48 N. Y., 132; Lassiter v.
Tel. Co., 89 N. C., 334; Passmore
v. Tel. Co., 7& Pa., 238; Vomack
v. Tel. Co., 58 Texas, 176.
The following are examples of
what the courts define to be "gross
negligence" of telegraph com-
panies : (i) unskillfulness of opera-
tor; Pegram v. Tel. Co., 97 N. C.,
57; (2) knowingly using a defec-
tive instrument, Sweatland v. Tel.
Co., 27 Ia., 433 ; (3) the mere trans-
position of two letters by an opera-
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tor in transcribing for delivery to a
connecting line, Leonard v. Tel.
Co., 41 N. Y., 544; (4) transmitting
a forged message, Ellwood v. Tel.
Co., 45 N. Y., 549; (5) any delay
'or failure to transmit or deliver,
dtqe to causes within the control of
the company, Parks v. Tel. Co., 13
Cal., 422; Manville v. Tel. Co., 37
Ia., 214; Barrett v. Tel. Co., 42
Mo. App., 542; True v. Tel. Co., 6o
Me., 9.
These examples indicate that
"gross negligence" is the absence
of any precaution relating to the
business of telegraphy which will
tend to insure the safe and speedy
transmission of messages. It is to
be noticed, however, that there is
one precaution which relates essen-
tially to the business of telegraphy
and which would tend greatly to
secure the accurate transmission
of messages, which telegraph com-
panies are not required to take,
viz., that of repeating the message
back to the transmitting office for
comparison with the original:
Wann v. Tel. Co., 37 Mo., 472 ;"
Passmore v. Tel. Co., 78 Pa., 238;
Lassiter v. Tel. Co., 89 N. C., 334.
The term "ordinary negligence"
as applied to telegraph companies
is very difficult of definition. Ac-
cording to all the dicta it is the
only negligence for which a tele-
graph company may limit its lia-
bility. The term itself, however,
has not yet been defined, although
in Pegram v. Tel. Co., 97 N. C., 57,
it was intimated that ordinary neg-
ligence is "an omission . . . inci-
dent to the service . . . where
there is slight attaching culpa-
bility." An examination of the
cases; however, will show that the
only mistakes or delays for which
a telegraph company is not liable,
even though the message is sent
subject to the regulations, are those
due to causes entirely beyond the
control of the company, -or those
which could have been guarded
against only by repeating the mes-
sage: Parks v. Tel. Co., 13 Cal.,
422; Manville v. Tel. Co., 37 Ia.,
214; Barrett v. Tel. Co., 42 Mo.
App., 542; True v. Tel. Co., 6o
Me., 9;' Fowler v. Tel. Co., 86 Me.,
381; Wann v. T'el. Co., 37 Mo., 472;
Lassiter v. Tel. Co., 89 N. C., 334;
Passmore v. Tel. Co., 78 Pa., 238.
These companies, however, are not
liable for mistakes due to causes
over which they have no control,
even though the message was not
sent subject to any stipulation by
them: Shields v. Tel. Co., 9 Western
Lawjournal, 283; Bowen v. Tel.Co.,
i Am. Law Reg., 685. Therefore
the term "ordinary negligence"
does not apply to cases where the
mistake or delay was due to causes
not within the control of the com-
pany. The only remaining cases
to which the term can possibly
apply are those in which the mis-
take could have been avoided only
by the use of the deice of repeat-
ing. Perhaps, therefote, the term
"ordinary negligence" means the
absence of the precaution of re-
peating the message. That this is
the meaning of the term is not
clear, however, for it i! not certain
that, even before these companies
made use of the stipulations in
their message blanks, that they
were bound to repeat messages for
comparison.
Whatever the meaning of the
.terms "gross" and "ordinary"
negligence may be, it is neverthe-
less well settled that telegraph
companies are not liable for mis-
takes due to causes over which
they have no control, and that
when the message is sent subject
to a stipulation in regard to repeat-
ing, the company is not liable for
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a mistake which could have been
avoided only by repeating.
Though according to the author-
ities a telegraph company may not
limit its liability for "gross negli-
gence," it may frequently evade
liability consequent on acts which
are grossly negligent by reason of
the construction placed upon the
stipulation in regard to unrepeated
messages. In New York, Pennsyl-
vania, Massachusetts, California,
Iowa, North Carolina, Missouri,
Kentucky and Texas it is held that
when a message is sent subject to
the stipulation in regard to repeat-
ing, the plaintiff, who has suffered
by reason of a mistake in the trans-
mission, must prove that the mis-
take was one which it was not only
in the power of the company to
avoid, but one which the company
could have avoided by some pre-
caution other than that of repeat-
ing: Kiley v. Tel. Co., io9 N. Y.,.
231 ; Passmore v. Tel. Co., 78 Pa.,
238; Ellis v. Tel. Co., 13 Allen,
226; Hart v. Tel. Co., 66 Cal., 579,
584; Aiken v. Tel. Co., 69 Ia., 32,
36; Lassiter v. Tel. Co., 89 N. C.,
334; Waun v. Tel. Co., 37 Mo.,
472; Camp v. Tel. Co., r Met.
(Ky.), 164; Womack v. Tel. Co.,
58 Tex., 176. It may very fre-
quently happen that the mistake
is due to the gross carelessness of
the telegraph company, and yet
the plaintiff'be unable to obtain
evidence to that effect. In this
way, therefore, a telegraph com-
pany may frequently escape the
liability which it should justly in-
cur by reason of its "gross negli-
gence." Thompson's Law of Elec-
tricity, p. 232. This rule applies
generally only where the loss suf-
fered has been occasioned by a
mistake in the transmission: Man-
ville v. Tel. Co., 37 Ia., 2I4; Tel.
Co. v. Adams, 75 Tex., 531; Bliss
v. Tel. Co., 30 Mo. App., 103; True
v. Tel. Co., 6o Me., 9: Graham v.
Tel. Co., i Col., 230; Fowler v.
Tel. Co., 8o Me., 381; Tel. Co. v.
Fontaine, 58 Ga., 433; Smith v.
Tel. Co., 83 Ky., io4: Tel. Co. v.
Wenger, .55 Pa., 262; Tel. Co. v.
Hyer, 22 Fla., 637; Clay v. Tel.
Co., 8i Ga., 285; Hadley v. Tel.
Co., S Ind., 191 ; Tel. Co. v. Col-
lins, 45 Kan., 88. In New York,
however, the rule applies where
the loss suffered was due to a delay
in the delivery: Kiley v. Tel. Co.,
I09 N. Y., 23L
This rule, which places the bur-
den of proof on the plaintiff, is not
followed in Maine,.Ohio, Illinois,
Tennessee or Arkansas. In these
States the mere fact of a mistake
in the transmission raises a pre-
sumption of gross negligence on
the part of the company, which
must be rebutted by evidence suffi-
cient to satisfy a jury: Bartlett v.
Tel. Co., 62 MC., 209; Tel. Co. v.
Griswold. 37 Ohio, 30i; Tel. Co. v.
Tyler, 74 Ill., 168; Marr v. Tel.
Co., 85 Tenn., 529; Tel. Co. v.
Short, 53 Ark., 434.
Another way in which a tele-
graph company may frequently
evade liability consequent upon
negligent acts is by the require-
ment that notice of a claim against
the company shall be presented
within a certain time: Wolf v. Tel.
Co., 62 Pa., 83.
The time in the stipulations to
this effect varies with the mes-
sage blanks of different companies.
The usual period of limitation is
sixty days, but periods as short as
thirty and even twenty days have
been held valid: Tel. Co. v. Dun-
field, ii Col., 335; Aiken v. Tel.
Co., 5 S. C., 358. The question is
always what is reasonable, and
where the purpose of the stipula-
tion, as appears from the period of
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limitation, seems to be rather to
preclude the employer from his
remedy than to enable the com-
pany to procure evidence in de-
fense of the action, the tendency
is to hold the condition unreason-'
able and void: Southern Express
Co. v. Capperton, 44 Ala., Ioi.
The scope of the company's lia-
bility may be limited by a condi-
tion which defines the limits within
which a personal delivery shall be
free of charge: Tel. Co. v. Heuder-
son, 89 Ala., 51o. This holds, also,
that the sender of a message is
bound to know whether the sendee
lives within the free-delivery limits,
and that if he does not offer to pay
the extra charge for delivery be-
yond the free limits, the company
is under no obligation to deliver
the message except within the free
limits. This part of the decision is
unsatisfactory, because, as delivery
is an essential part of communica-
tiom by telegraph, it would seem
that when a message is handed in
for transmission, the price de-
manded for transmission ought to
include any extra charge which the
company are entitled to make for
delivery.
A telegraph company is not lia-
ble for the negligence of a connect-
ing line when a message is sent
subject to a stipulation to that effect:
Tel." Co. z. Mumford, 8 7 Tenn., x9o.
The liability of telegraph com-
panies can scarcely be said to be
limited in this respect, because it
would seem that by reason of their
analogy to common carriers, they
would not be liable for errors oc-
curring on connecting lines in the
absence of a special agreement to
that effect: Am. & Eng. Ency. of
Law, Vol. 2, p. 859. In the case of
carriers, however, such a special
agreement may be implied from the
facts and attending circumstances
of the case, as where the freight for
the entire route is reckoned in one
sum: Redf. on Carriers, 189. By
analogy, therefore, it would seem
that a telegraph company, in the
absence of a stipulation to the con-
trary, might be held liable for errors
occurring on connecting lines.
Therefore, though in strictness a
telegraph company cannot be said
to limit its liability in respect to
connecting lines, it certainly may
affect its liability by a stipulation
which practically serves to rebut
the presumption of a contract which
might be implied from circum-
stances attending the sending of
the message.
Our conclusions from the discus-
sion of the above question are as
follows: (i) Telegraph companies
may not limit their liability for
"gross negligence;" gross negli-
gence meaning the absenci of any
reasonable precaution relating to
and tending toward the safe trans-
mission of messages by telegraph,
save the precaution of repeating the
message. (2) In several States, by
reason of the peculiar construction
placed upon the stipulation in re-
gard to repeating messages, tele-
graph companies may frequently
escape liability for "gross negli-
gence." (3) Telegraph companies
may also evade liability for "gross
negligence," by stipulating that
notice of claims against them be
presented within a certain time.
(4) The scope of the liability of
telegraph companies may be lim-
ited by a stipulation defining the
limits of free delivery. (5) Tele-
graph companies may evade the
liability, which in many cases they
might incur, by reason of the neg-
ligence of connecting lines.
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